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PERSPECTIVE
On the Elimination of the
NATO Entitlement
Vaughn A. Carney*
Fortunately for all Americans, President Clinton has identified and
publicly acknowledged the most daunting challenge facing his nascent
Administration: the budgetary constraints imposed by the enormous and
growing federal budget deficit. For example, his proposed tax cut for the
middle-class has evaporated in the wake of recent disclosures of the Bush
Administration's understatement of the deficit. This proposal is only the
first of many Clinton initiatives which will be scuttled as a result of un-
foreseen or undisclosed public debt. Even before Clinton's inauguration,
representatives of a multitude of special interest groups positioned them-
selves for the bruising battles which will most assuredly be fought during
the next year; while everyone accepts that many domestic entitlements
will be frozen or cut, the bottom line is, quite simply, whose sacred cow
will be gored. For reasons bearing directly upon U.S. economic competi-
tiveness in the international marketplace, I submit that among the first
entitlements considered for radical reduction should be the U.S. financial
commitment to NATO.
Since the inception of NATO over forty years ago, the U.S. has
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borne the lion's share of the burden of defending western Europe, at a
total cost to the U.S. taxpayer of nearly $2.2 trillion.1 Our NATO com-
mitments now cost us over $160 billion per year, approximately half the
defense budget.2 And this figure does not even take into account the
nearly $40 billion expended annually to secure and protect the Persian
GUlf.3 Great Britain, France and Germany each spend a total of roughly
$28 billion annually on defense.4 Clearly, this arrangement cannot con-
tinue, first because the U.S. can ill afford it, and secondly because our
European allies can and should assume the burden of their own defense,
much as they resent having to do so. The problem here is that our allies
have grown dependent upon our contribution to the extent of taking it
for granted; it is not that they are unable to assume this obligation, but
simply that they are unwilling to step up to it. Their reluctance to alter
the arrangement is understandable, and they can hardly be blamed for
taking full advantage of this dandy entitlement. After all, when a region
as large as western Europe must be defended, everyone there is a benefici-
ary, even those who pay next to nothing by relative measure.
Many observers have argued that with the break-up of the Soviet
Union, NATO has been rendered obsolete. I do not agree. The break-
away republics have replaced the Soviet threat with an element of insta-
bility in eastern Europe not seen since prior to World War I. For
instance, the fact that the Ukraine, which is not a party to the START
talks, has within its borders an inordinately large arsenal of nuclear
weapons is reason enough not to abolish NATO as we know it. More-
over, the chaos in Bosnia may be merely an ominous harbinger of strife
to come in other places. While the role of world leader and sole super-
power, with all of the attendant responsibilities, has devolved upon the
U.S., there is an enormous and identifiable cost associated with this role -
a cost which we can no longer absorb.
Ardent supporters of our heavy subsidization of NATO argue that
we must continue this support in order to maintain favorable trade rela-
tions with western Europe. However, this contention is less than con-
vincing considering the huge trade deficits that we have run with western
Europe for the last ten years.5 This contention also loses force in view of
the fact that our trade with the Pacific Rim nations surpassed trade with
western Europe in 1986, and continues to increase dramatically in com-
1 NATO AT FORTY: CONFRONTING A CHANGING WORLD, (T.G. Carpenter, Ed.) Cato Insti-
tute, Washington, D.C. 95-96 (1990).
2 Id. at 47-58.
3 Id. at 95.
4 Id. at 48.
5 Id at 99.
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parison.6 Some contend that because our allies purchase a substantial
portion of our government debt instruments, these markets are likely to
dry up if we attempt to lay the bulk of NATO's cost onto them. I cate-
gorically state that these markets will vanish overnight the first time the
U.S. government declares its inability to meet the interest payments on
the federal debt - which, by our current projections, should occur in early
1996.1 What value will the U.S. have to any ally, anywhere, in a debili-
tated and near-bankrupt state? Worse yet, consider the awful conse-
quences here at home: hyperinflation or the gradual collapse of our
infrastructure.
The phrase "mercenary army" rightly makes most Americans un-
comfortable. Yet this is exactly what was assembled and sent to liberate
Kuwait in 1991. Moderate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Ku-
wait, as well as our NATO allies and Japan (who all depend more heav-
ily on Persian Gulf oil than we do), contributed to the cost of Operation
Desert Storm. Suffice it to say that there is an unequivocal and recent
precedent for the concept. Indeed, what we have maintained in Europe
for the last forty years is also a mercenary army of sorts, the only distinc-
tion being that we, rather than the direct beneficiaries, have paid the cost.
The U.S. is no longer sitting astride the globe as its unquestioned
economic giant, as it was in the post-World War II years when NATO
was formed. President Clinton must act swiftly and boldly. He must
convene a summit with our NATO allies for the express purpose of nego-
tiating the terms by which this economic burden will be shifted, with the
goal of transferring $40 billion, or roughly one-quarter of our annual
NATO commitment, to western Europe within the next fiscal year.
Thereafter, our allies should assume increments of this cost until the
yearly U.S. contribution is reduced to a predetermined level of no more
than $10 billion by 1997. Supreme Command of NATO forces would, of
course, remain with the U.S. military. But in the unlikely event that our
allies are unwilling to assume these costs, we should then commence a
rapid and massive withdrawal of the U.S. troops, personnel, military
equipment, materiel and installations devoted to the defense of western
Europe. If our allies genuinely believe that they no longer need our
assistance, then we must respect and act upon this determination.
In any event, the American taxpayer must not be saddled with these
costs, for all too soon the chickens of past fiscal irresponsibility will come
home to roost and the privations will be numerous and widespread.
6 Id. at 99-101.
7 KENNETH ADELMAN & NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, THE DEFENSE REVOLUTION: INTELLI-
GENT DOwNsIZING OF AMERICA'S MILITARY, 77-120 (1990).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 13:487(1993)
President Clinton and his economic advisors plainly do not have enough
time to "grow the economy," and any talk of pursuing this course before
seriously tackling the federal debt is utterly fatuous. A number of eco-
nomic analyses have concluded that U.S. military spending-the highest
by far among western industrialized countries-is hampering our efforts
to compete economically with these same countries.' Furthermore, a
close correlation can be demonstrated between a nation's defense spend-
ing and various determinants of international economic competitiveness.
For the last twenty years the U.S. has been living on borrowed time
and money; we have gotten something for nothing. Now we must con-
front the painful opposite: nothing for something. A radical shift in our
financial commitment to NATO will go a long way toward easing this
pain and shoring up the competitive position of the U.S. going forward
into the twenty-first century.
8 T.G. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 93-107.
